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
The Truth About Raoul Wallenberg

Rudolph Philipp

Vecko-Journalen, No 29, 21-28 July 1956, Stockholm, pp 5-13 and 30, 31;
No 30, 28 July-4 August 1956, Stockholm, pp 14-17 and 32.

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(This report has not been edited
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Vecko Journalen [Weekly Journal],
No 29, 21-28 July 1953, Stockholm,
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July-4 August 1956, Stockholm,
Pages 14-17 and 32

Rudolph Philipp

NEW PROOF CONCERNING WALLENBERG; IN A NEW SERIES
OF ARTICLES RUDOLPH PHILIPP PRESENTS UNPUBLISHED MATERIAL
FROM HIS SECRET DOSSIER

[No 29]

The Soviet prisoners, who under military guard had been taken to the processing camp "Friedland" in West Germany, left the train. They were free.

Among the returning prisoners was a long awaited witness, a former German Attache who knew about Kaoul Wallenberg. A German Red Cross worker, and a representative from the Swedish Department of Foreign Affairs asked him, "Have you met any Swedes in prison?"

He answered, "How did you know? As soon as I get the opportunity I am to telegraph the Foreign Office in Stockholm and report that I have regards from Kaoul Wallenberg, Legation Secretary, to his mother and to his entire family and relatives. Kaoul is the

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finest and the grade I have met during my entire life. I was his first cell mate when he was brought to the Lubyanka prison in Moscow on 31 January 1945. We promised each other that whoever was freed first would immediately send regards to the closest relatives and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs."

The released prisoner recorded his testimony as well as Raoul's regards on a tape recorder. Again a link in the chain of evidence. But how much evidence does one need before the Russians finally let Raoul Wallenberg return home? It will never do to dismiss the quantity of binding testimony by reasoning and explanations. They carry such force that the Swedish Government ought to be able to put more pressure into its demands. One ought to demand the immediate release of Raoul.

The Swedish people are also entitled to know about our proof, otherwise it runs the risk that the government once more goes back on its promises, and remains satisfied with the same type of vague explanations as heretofore. The cards must be placed on the table.

As the first step I shall report about Eberhard Muller, one of our most important witnesses.

Eberhard Muller and his wife recently returned from the Soviet Union. The name Muller is fictitious but the man pictured is really the witness. His real name cannot yet be disclosed because the Department of Foreign Affairs long refused to use the testimony gathered by the group interested in the Wallenberg activities. The reason was this: if we force the Russians against the wall we will provoke a death certificate. There was one important case: the Soviet had kidnapped a Western diplomat. In the face of all demarches, Moscow answered: "We don't know anything." When the

West Government finally submitted all its material evidence and admitted that they, after a certain period, had no further information, Moscow answered with a German death certificate. The diplomat had died of natural causes in the Soviet Union after the period indicated by his government. When Foreign Minister, Uden, at the request of the Russians, delivered "compromising material," it was done despite agreements in connection with the case, without obtaining approval from Philipp. It was not until several days after 12 May that the author found out that, among other things, Muller's testimony had gone to Moscow. Philipp then wrote to Muller and asked, retroactively, for permission first, to deliver his testimony to the Russians, and second, to use it in the government's heralded Vitbok [White Paper], and thereby accomplish Wallenberg's release. Muller gave his permission but, for security reasons, his real name has been withheld. For the same reason Philipp is asking, "Stop asking me and Raoul's family and relatives on what day we received the most recent proof that Raoul is still alive. It could mean that the Russians would put an end to the withholding tactics with a death certificate on the "prisoner Raoul Wallenberg."

For several years one task belonged among my routine work -- to listen at night to foreign radio broadcasts for information about returned Soviet prisoners.

My interest centered on all prisoners whom the Russians might have considered especially important. Prisoners of the same category as Raoul Wallenberg and his Hungarian chauffeur, Vilmos Langfelder. They belong among the "Privileged" who regardless of rank are usually treated better than generals.

Among the privileged prisoners I considered vice corporal Eberhard Muller. Independently several highly trustworthy "Heimkehrer" (returnees) -- returning prisoners of war and civilian internees -- reported that they had heard speak of Wallenberg and Langfelder.

In 1954 we learned through a prominent "Heimkehrer" that Muller had returned with their transport. The returning prisoners are always permitted to choose for themselves whether they want to be repatriated to East- or West-Germany. Muller had chosen East-Germany. We presumed he had done so because he had close relatives in the German Democratic Republic.

The Department of Foreign Affairs and the government experts on criminology tried unsuccessfully to contact Eberhard Muller. They looked for him in West Berlin and also in West Germany in the hope that he had moved there illegally. But without result.

When Department of Foreign Affairs and the government's experts on criminology asked me to try, both Raoul's family and the chairman of the Raoul Wallenberg Activities, Mrs. Birgitta de Vylder-Bellander, were against such a dangerous experiment. They had long been convinced that it was senseless to try to find new witnesses. The government did not even use the extensive material evidence already on hand for the energetic diplomatic steps, which the leaders of the Foreign Ministry had so long promised.

However, on 9 April 1954 I was called to the Cabinet Secretary, Arne S. Lundberg. As usual my closest "man," Mrs. de Vylder-Bellander accompanied me. Lundberg said among other things:

"Something extraordinary must be done so that the Russians may understand the seriousness of the matter. We are debating sending Unden to the Soviet Union to speak with the Supreme Command. If it should prove necessary, I will have to go to Moscow myself to clarify the matter in the minutest detail."

I answered: "When do you think Unden will be able to go?"

"Not until after the Geneva Meeting."

"Would the result of the meeting in Geneva have any significance in connection with this case?"

"Naturally not. But Molotov, who now is believed to have considerable power, ought to be back. When Unden himself goes, it will show that we consider this case extremely important and that we intend to get to the bottom of it."

The Hunt for Muller Begins

This was the first time I had heard that Unden was contemplating a trip to Moscow. Considering this fact I, in spite of my co-worker's objections, decided that I ought to attempt to interrogate Eberhard Muller. Consequently, I looked up Karl Evert Sundblad one of the best voluntary workers for Raoul's case. I knew that Sundblad, from his previous years in Germany, was a good friend of Eberhard Muller. I asked him to write his name on a few sheets of blank writing paper. If he were to receive letters from East Germany, he was then to leave them, unopened, for me. He agreed to my request without questions.

My plan was to try to contact Eberhard Muller through letters. Unfortunately, we only had Mrs. Muller's address. Her hometown was in a "Uran-Sperrgebiet" [Uranian Closed Zone or district], a territory where almost 300,000 workers mine metal containing uranium for the Soviet Russian Monopoly Enterprise "Wismut AG". Muller's comrades, returning to West Germany, reported that he was travelling with a new girlfriend he had met in prison. It was not very likely, therefore, that Muller had returned to his wife. But I figured that the East-German and Soviet Russian Censors might help me in forwarding my letter to him.

Therefore, I wrote to Eberhard Muller using his wife's address. And I wrote as Karl Evert Sundblad. I expressed my joy that I through old friends had heard that Eberhard had returned. I reported that I had married, was getting along well, had 3 fine children, and had a good income. I wrote that I hoped Eberhard likewise was doing well, that he had met his family and found them in good health. I expressed my complete understanding of his decision not to go to West Germany like most of the other "Heimkehrer," without trying to help build up that part of Germany where he had his roots. I myself was very interested in visiting the East some of Germany some time, because I was convinced that a real spirit of progress prevailed there.

On the other hand I could understand that there were many difficulties in a country which was being re-built from the ruins of the Third Reich. I asked him, therefore, not to misinterpret my intentions when I, as an old friend, from a "war-spared" country, wanted to send a few clothes and shoes, above all for his children. Could he please write and tell me their approximate sizes, both his own and those of his children. If the duty would be too high, I would then provide currency for it if not in the same denomination, then at least in usable currency.

A few weeks later I received an answer from Eberhard Muller via Sundblad. As I had expected, the censor had opened my letter and had done everything possible to get it to the addressee. After all, the letter indicated such a sympathetic attitude toward the German Democratic Republic. Eberhard thanked me warmly because I had not forgotten him and reported that he had a nice position in the Kommunistiska Kulturförbundet (Communist Cultural Alliance), that his first wife had died and that his new wife worked as a translator of Russian books. He was so happy that I did not believe all the lies about East Germany. There was much that could also be learned in his country, and he hoped that I would be able to visit there, perhaps during the Leipzig Fair. He also thanked me for the picture of my family. In my letter I had enclosed a picture of the Sundblad family. I had received the picture as a Christmas greeting from Karl Evert. Eberhard was touched by the offering of the clothes. In the hope that he would sometime be able to repay the kindness, he concluded the letter with many hearty greetings from Eberhard and his new wife.

I Begin My Trip

On 18 June 1954 Osten Unden returned from his 10-day "private visit" to Moscow. On 20 June the Cabinet Secretary had a conference with Mrs. Bellander and myself. As a result of this meeting I wrote down the following, which was intended as a "last will and testament" to my co-workers if I did not return from the far from safe expedition: "If the motive and objective of Unden's Moscow trip was really -- as Lundberg solemnly explained to Mrs. Bellander and myself -- to solve this extraordinary problem with extraordinary methods, a testimony from Eberhard Muller could be vital for Raoul. According to Lundberg, the Soviet members of

the government told Unden, "We are ready to reopen the case of Raoul Wallenberg if Sweden can give us material evidence to the effect that R. W. is now or has been, in the custody of the Soviet Union." According to Lundberg the Soviet negotiators had added, "what the Swedish newspapers have published to date is of no value to us." Before I, Raoul's family, and my coworkers take up a new open battle, I feel it is my responsibility to comply with the latest request from the Russians to produce unpublished evidence to prove that Raoul has been imprisoned within the Soviet-Russian territory.

On 29 June the Cabinet Secretary called on the telephone, "The Swedish Consul General to Berlin, Tham, is here. We will confer with you."

On the way to the Department of Foreign Affairs, I stopped and bought a roundtrip plane ticket to Berlin. I expected advice and directions for my work from Sweden's Consul General in Berlin, but after the introduction the Cabinet Secretary began summing up all the difficulties and risks. A few days prior to this, Lundberg had completely agreed with the Political Department Chief, Gunnar Jarring, and with the government's experts on criminology that I ought to go. In the first place, Lundberg thought it would be very difficult to contact Muller. If this task could be accomplished, the contact man would surely lose his life. Muller's letter proved that he was either a Communist or that he feared the authorities. If this were so it might easily be assumed that he would betray the contact man. As far as I, myself, was concerned I would be shadowed from the very first moment by East German spies. They were all over West Germany. Consul General Tham was also pessimistic. He did not believe I would obtain Muller's testimony even if I succeeded in contacting him.

"I am flying tomorrow morning at 8:40 o'clock and will reach Berlin at 13:25. Will the Consul General be kind enough to send a trustworthy person to meet me at the airport and drive me to the residence of a friend?"

"If you have decided to go, then you shall go," answered the Cabinet Secretary and continued to Tham: "I take it that you can arrange by code-telegram for someone to call for Philipp?"

"Yes, surely."

"What is the name of the fellow who is to meet me?"

"Benkt."

Lundberg and Tham wished me good luck.

I bought a travelling bag of pressed cardboard for the clothes and shoes for Muller. I was to travel as a "Mr. Berg" from Stockholm, a good friend of Karl Evert Sundblad, on a through-trip in Berlin.

I landed in Berlin-Tempelhof on 30 June 13:25 o'clock. At the delivery window of the baggage room a gentleman came over to me. He had recognized the Swedish flag on one of my bags, according to directions in the code-telegram. I asked: "Are you Benkt?" He answered "Yes! My name is Rudolph."

In the car I reported that I was Raoul Wallenberg's contact man. Benkt, who appeared trustworthy, intelligent, and honest was acquainted with Raoul's history as a whole. Benkt had worked at the Consulate General for the past 5 years. His name was Ljunglin and he was de facto the Vice Consul. He knew Eberhard Muller by name. At the request of his superior he had tried to find him, so far without success. I explained to him that I had to contact Muller and interrogate him, if possible, in the presence of 2 civil servants of the consulate.

The Meeting with the Witness Muller

At 9 o'clock on 5 July Eberhard Muller, his new wife, and Benkt and I were sitting in the home of a nonpolitical "typical German," just outside the town. I was Mr. Berg from Stockholm, a friend of Karl Evert Sundblad. Benkt was a Swedish Charge d'Affairs, active for the past few years in Berlin. I had deposited all my presents with the Germans (the presents I had from my friend Sundblad).

Muller was about 170 cm tall, built squarely, with a round face and bright, brown eyes. I estimated his age at around 40 years. He was extremely grateful to me, who had brought so much; he did not have enough words of praise for his good friend Karl Evert Sundblad. Mrs. Muller was a small blond woman, at most 160 cm tall; she would have been beautiful had she had the opportunity to care for her hair and complexion. Some of her upper front teeth were missing. Mrs. Muller's personal wishes were mostly to obtain a nail file, a little powder and a lipstick, and, for the first time in many years, a pair of nylons instead of the heavily darned cotton hose she wore. She appeared to be deeply religious. She reported at great length on her hard years in a slave camp near the Arctic Ocean, where undernourished women work in the coal mines in an average temperature of 40 below zero and where the summer lasts only a few weeks. Mrs. Muller had been arrested in Berlin in 1948. She had been employed in the Office of the Allies then.

Eberhard Muller described with great intensity his experiences as a Soviet prisoner. He had stayed in many different prisons and for some time in a POW camp. He had become anti-Nazi while he was at the front and had been taken prisoner by the Russians.

in the spring of 1945. For 2 months he was transferred around among the various staffs in the front territory. He was then transferred to the Moscow prisons Lefortovskaya and Butyrka and to the prisoner of war camp at Krasnogorsk.

When Muller arrived at this camp the investigating judge said: "You have been tried and there are no indictments or evidence against you. Therefore we are going to place you in a POW camp." However in 1946 Muller was again returned to Lefortovskaya and again treated as a suspect prisoner. In the end he was given a 25 year sentence and placed in solitary confinement. In 1953 without knowing why he was given amnesty together with other Germans. But he was returned home only much later.

Don't You Know Anything About Wallenberg?

When Eberhard Muller and his wife told of their needs, I suggested that Benkt should drive us to a department store where we could buy a few cosmetics, a pair of stockings and shoes for Mrs. Muller and Mr. Muller. With tears in their eyes Muller and his wife protested: "This is going too far, we cannot take advantage of you to that extent."

"This here I have brought from Karl Evert. When we have made the purchases we can stop for a bite before we depart."

Benkt and I got up. Slowly Eberhard Muller also got up, turned to Benkt, and said:

"Mr. Attache, is Wallenberg back?"

Benkt did not know what he should answer and could not comprehend how Muller had figured out that he was from the Department of Foreign Affairs.

"Which Wallenberg?" stuttered Benkt, "Do you mean Wallenstein or Wallenheim?"

"No, after all you are Swedes," Muller answered, "You must have heard about Legation Secretary Wallenberg, the man who was employed at the Swedish Legation in Budapest."

"What interest do you have in that matter," I asked?

"It is very important to me," Muller answered. "If the Russians did not send Wallenberg back, then I cannot understand why the Russians released me! When I have told you all I know about the case you will understand how important a role Wallenberg and his chauffeur have played for me and my unfortunate comrades. Anyone who had had the least contact with Wallenberg and Langfelder were brought back sooner or later to the prisons from the POW camp, yes, even from the repatriation camp, often a few weeks before returning home!"

"Therefore, when I unexpectedly was given permission to go along in a home-transport, I was sure that Wallenberg and Langfelder had been sent home and that we, consequently, were no longer important to the Russians."

"Well, this is very interesting," I commented. "Now we will have to sit down again and hear all you know. When you first asked my friend, here, we thought you were a provocator who was trying to trip us into something. The fact that we hid in a CD-auto does not alter the fact that Benkt is a Charge d'Affairs and I am an author. You are Karl Evert's friend. I do believe you are frank with us. And, as you yourself said, as Swedes we are interested in where every imprisoned countryman of ours is."

Muller and his wife were beaming with happiness because they were able to help us, so that it was not just they who were getting help. Without showing the least inhibition, Eberhard Muller began to report. He did not hold anything back. Both he and his wife asked us not to release their names and thereby expose them and Muller's children still living in East Germany to further difficulties. I wrote on and on, page after page was filled. Muller reported, brought up episodes and people, prisons, doctors, prisoners, life, death, hopelessness and monotony, stubborn courage. The hours passed. The names of Wallenberg and Langfelder occurred over and over again in Muller's story which is repeated here in summary:

I was born 1913. As vice corporal I was taken prisoner by the Russians in January 1945. At the end of February I was turned over to the NKVD by the Red Army (NKVD, the mightiest of the political police). On 4 March I was transported by railway to Moscow. On 6 March I arrived at the Lubyanka prison (NKVD's headquarters). The same night I was moved to cell 105 in Lefortovskaya prison. On 12 and 13 March I was interrogated by a NKVD major about my life and how I had come to be taken prisoner.

On 20 March a man named Vilmos Langfelder was placed in the same cell with me, cell 105. He spoke German fluently and I asked him, "Are you German?"

Langfelder answered, "No, I am Hungarian with a Swedish passport. I was together with a Swedish diplomat, we were both arrested in Budapest."

As far as I can remember after a period of 10 years, Langfelder reported the following about himself and his friend, Wallenberg's

arrest," I am a civil engineer. My native language is Hungarian, but I learned German at an early age; in 1932 I went to Germany. In Budapest my family owned a big machine manufacturing plant which in 1944 was "taken over" by the Goering Concern or by Messerschmitt. I have never worked in our manufacturing plant. I was consulting engineer and inventor. When the Jews were prohibited to work independently, I became a secretary in an export firm.

In the summer of 1944 I was saved through Wallenberg's interference. He was Legation secretary with a special assignment, to protect the Jews. Sweden likewise had been assigned by the Soviet Union to afford power of protection in Hungary.

Budapest was completely surrounded by the Red Army. The section that suffered most under the German bombardment was the section where the Legation was located. There were air raid shelters there. Wallenberg decided to get in touch with the Russian Supreme Command, above all to try to stop the Red Army from shooting at the Section where the Legation was located. He carried approximately 1.5 million pengos with him. On the way we passed a Branch office of the Swedish Legation. Wallenberg informed them there that he was taking a trip to Russian Headquarters in an attempt to intervene.

The first Russian staff we encountered received us very nicely but explained that Wallenberg's request would have to be placed before Marshall Malinowski personally. Another staff, likewise, explained that they had no authority.

We were placed under guard and had to spend 2 nights with the staff. But we did have a certain amount of freedom to move around. One morning we asked to have a bath. We got it.

from this staff we were brought to the periphery of Budapest. We had a long wait there. Finally a major came and said, "Be good enough to give me all your papers."

Wallenberg answered: "I am a diplomat, I can only let you have such papers as I consider it right to let you have."

The major: "I said all papers!"

Wallenberg: "That means you arrest us."

The Major: "You may consider it that way."

Wallenberg turned over all his papers. For some time we waited under guard in a building. While inside we were allowed to walk around quite freely."

What Langfelder reported must have taken place in the middle of January 1945. To the best of my knowledge I cannot give any definite time period. From the continuation of Langfelder's report I recall that he and Wallenberg were transported by train via Rumania, Odessa and Kiev to Moscow. They were escorted by an officer.

At a railway station in Rumania Wallenberg slipped a note to a Rumanian worker or peasant and asked him to forward it to Sweden. In the note he had written a few words saying that he and Langfelder had been arrested and were on the way to Russia.

In Kiev they left the train and the officer took them for a walk in the town. The officer bought a newspaper and read the latest news from the front for Langfelder and Wallenberg.

In Moscow the officer went with Wallenberg and Langfelder to a large department store. There they had to buy many things for

their money. Later the officer brought them to the Ministry of Domestic Affairs. (The Department of Domestic Affairs has an imposing facade toward Lubyanka Street, with beautiful portals, elegant offices, a large banquet room and club facilities for the NKVD Club Djersjinski, named after Tejekan's pioneers. But the rear of the Ministry Building is much wider than the front. It faces a long, grey, narrow, over-all well-guarded caserne street, Little Lubyanka Street. No civilian goes there of his own will.

During the thirties, when I was in Moscow as a foreign specialist on rationalization, I was invited to the Foreign Specialists' Club, also named for Djersjinski. The taxi driver drove me, by mistake, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I believe that I am one of the few who came in and out of NKVD's headquarters alive.

Most interrogations occur at night. Through long, subterranean corridors prisoners are brought up to an almost luxurious interrogation room. All the way the guard hits the buckle of his belt. That is the signal to other guards to prevent another transport of prisoners from crossing the corridor and to make sure that no other prisoner sees the comrade being brought in or out from the interrogation. R. Philipp's note).

Here Muller's report continued:

On 6 February 1945 Langfelder was separated from Wallenberg. Langfelder was placed in cell No 140.

"It is strange that I am always brought to a cell, the number of which can be divided by 35," he said to me, "140, 105 and 35."

When Langfelder was placed in cell 149, 2 prisoners were already there, the German Koedel and a Czech.

Langfelder reported often and much about Koedel, with whom he came to be on very friendly terms. He showed me an empty cigarette box on which Koedel had written his name in large letters so Langfelder would never forget him. When he showed me the box he said: "It was unnecessary for him to write his name, I could never forget Koedel." Langfelder, on the other hand, never spoke voluntarily about the other cell mate, the Czech. Once I asked him frankly about the Czech. He answered: "No, I never knew him well. He was a Czech who became a German citizen. Later he was drafted for the Wehrmacht. In 1943 he deserted to the Russians and was arrested. Since then he has been sitting in Lublyanka. Now he is reading Russian books all day long. I think his father was a Communist.

Langfelder himself was called for interrogation only twice. The interrogator was a major, tall, slender, and dark. The major let him report all that had happened up to his arrest and recorded protocol. Langfelder had the impression that he and Hallenberg were regarded or considered as spies. An accusation of that type had once been read to Langfelder by the major.

On 16 March 1945 Langfelder was moved to Lefortovskaya, where he sat all alone in cell 95. Later he was moved to cell 105, where he met me, who for 1. days had been sitting alone in that cell.

While we were together I asked Langfelder whether Hallenberg had informed the Legation that he intended to start action with the Russians.

Langfelder answered, "He could not do that. There was no time, and the Swedish Government would not understand such a step because Wallenberg had risked arrest."

(It is uncanny that Langfelder, when Unden was not yet Minister of Foreign Affairs, was able to foresee how the Swedish government, 10 months later, were to judge Raoul's move.

In November 1946 the Department of Foreign Affairs explained in a communique that if Raoul Wallenberg had acted as I described in the book Raoul Wallenberg -- diplomat, kämpare, samaritansk (Raoul Wallenberg -- Diplomat, fighter, Samaritan) he had then overstepped his authority.

Didn't the Department of Foreign Affairs know that it was technically impossible for Wallenberg to seek council with either the Chief, who had had to seek refuge in a cellar on the other side of the front, or with the Administration on foreign policies in Stockholm? (K. Philipp's note).

Eberhard Muller continues here:

On 6 April 1945 I was brought from cell 105 to Butyrka prison. Langfelder, on the other hand, remained in Lubyanka. In May 1945 the Czech was also transferred from Lubyanka to my cell in Butyrka. He did not tell me, however, that he was a Czech, so I did not know that he was the "Czech."

For a whole year I was transferred around among various prisons and it was not until November 1946 that I for the first time talked to the Czech about Wallenberg and Langfelder.

I asked him then if he had ever met Langfelder; the Czech answered, "Yes." He continued, "The same day that Langfelder was transferred from our cell in Lubyanka (Kudolph Philipp's note: it should, according to Langfelder, be cell 140, 18 March 1945) another prisoner was placed in the cell with Koedel and me. That was Langfelder's Swedish boss, Wallenberg. He asked us about Langfelder. Wallenberg was a good comrade and sent his cigarettes and his tobacco rations to Langfelder through the guard.

Wallenberg was brought up for interrogation several times. To us, his cell mates, he said, that the Russians did not have the slightest reason to arrest him. In Budapest his Legation had worked for the Russians. But the leaders of the interrogations did not believe Wallenberg and said: "You are a rich Swedish capitalist, what can anybody like that do for the Russians?"

The Czech likewise reported that the same day he was transferred to cell 92 in Butyrka, Wallenberg and Koedel were transported in the same prison car from Lubyanka.

Wallenberg and Koedel sat in one of the closed stalls in the prison car and the Czech sat in another.

The prison car drove up first to the Lefortovskaya prison. Through a slit in the wall the Czech had seen how Langfelder and Wallenberg had been let out of the car. The Czech, himself, was transferred to Butyrka prison.

FIGURE CAPTIONS

[page 6, original]

Kudolph Philipp, the man, who has for 10 years led the Wallenberg action and who has been the driving force in all the investigations.

[pages 8 and 9, original]

This is the last picture of Raoul Wallenberg. It was taken of Wallenberg and his "General Staff" in the cellar of a large Hungarian Bank on 26 November 1944. Wallenberg, as Swedish charge d'affaires, voluntarily contacted the Russians on 13 January 1945. On 16 January Moscow's Department of Foreign Affairs reported that Wallenberg had been taken into custody. He returned on 17 January under German escort to pick up his baggage. His departing remark was: "I am going to High Headquarters, as guest or prisoner, I don't know." On 31 January he was placed in NKVD's infamous prison, Lubyanka, in Moscow. On 18 August 1947, the Russians answered for the first time through the Department of Foreign Affairs and denied any and all knowledge of Wallenberg.

[page 10, upper left, original]

Vilmos Langfelder, above, fellow prisoner of Raoul. Vilmos Langfelder is a civil engineer. He acted as Raoul's chauffeur and bodyguard and accompanied him into imprisonment. He has not returned either.

CONTACT WITH RAOUL RESULTED IN MORE SEVERE SENTENCES;
NEW DOCUMENTS FROM RAUDOLPH PHILIPP'S SECRET WALLENBERG DOSSIER

Rudolph Nilsson

From 1946 until December 1951 Philipp fought a battle on 2 fronts. The first was with Moscow, which refused to answer any and all of the demarches from the Swedish Department of Foreign Affairs. The second front constituted our own Administration of Foreign Affairs, which could not be dissuaded from their defeatist and frightened attitude, which signified their "actions" in the wallenberg case.

However, on 11 December 1951, a "gentlemen's agreement" was concluded between Cabinet Secretary, Arne S. Lundberg, as representative of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Rudolph Philipp, as Raoul wallenberg's representative, and wallenberg's family. In it it was -- among other things -- agreed that they would cooperate to attempt to save Raoul. The investigations of witnesses who returned home from imprisonment in Russia could then be carried out rationally. Among the witnesses interrogated was "Eberhard Muller," whose testimony was in part printed in the previous issue.

There were 4 persons in the parlor of the nonpolitical "typical German" ["appeltysk"] who placed his bun,alow at my disposal. It was 5 July 1954; 5 days earlier I had started from Bromma on what I was convinced was a dangerous adventure. It involved getting an important witness in the Raoul wallenberg case through the Iron Curtain.

But the most dangerous part of the adventure was now behind me. The witness, "Bernard Muller," was sitting in peace and quiet before us. He reported, without reservations and without fear, all he had experienced during 9 long years in Russian imprisonment -- about his fellow prisoners and, most important, what he directly and indirectly knew about Raoul Wallenberg and his chauffeur, Vilmos Langfelder. Beside Muller sat his wife; she was small and blond and had a few upper front teeth missing -- evidence of the years she spent as a Russian slave worker near the Antarctic Ocean. The third person in the party was Benkt Ljunglin, civil servant of the Department of Foreign Affairs, who was stationed in Berlin, and who, for safety's sake, was to act as a Swedish official living in the town. I was the fourth person; my assignment was to ask and record questions. I looked through the protocol of Muller's testimony. In one place it read, "On 20 March 1945 a man named Vilmos Langfelder was placed in cell number 105, the same cell I occupied in the Lefortovskaya prison in Moscow. He reported that he was a Hungarian with a Swedish passport; that he had been together with a Swedish diplomat, and that they had both been arrested by Russians in Budapest."

A few pages further on was a report about another one of Muller's cell mates, a Czech whom he had met in the concentration camp in Krasnogorsk. Muller had asked the Czech if he had met Wallenberg and Langfelder. He had received the answer "yes." He had been sitting in the same cell with both of them, cell 140, in the Lubyanka Prison in Moscow. He had been together, first with Langfelder, and later, when Langfelder was removed, with Wallenberg. "Wallenberg was a very nice comrade, who sent his cigarettes and tobacco rations to Langfelder via the guard," the Czech had told Muller. The Czech had also seen how Wallenberg was taken away in a prison vehicle.

The Jew Rescuer Wallenberg Shared A Cell With German Jew
Executioner

Edmund Muller had had to change prisons constantly during his years in Russia. He had also had to change cell mates constantly. The Soviet imprisonment principle is to isolate prisoners who know something which must not seep out. But if a larger circle is involved, individual prisoners are not isolated but are all kept separate from those prisoners with no knowledge or information about it. It is not from a sadistic standpoint alone, but from a rational point of view that isolated prisoners are occasionally kept in solitary confinement. This usually happens when the prisoner is suspected of not having reported the names of all the prisoners to whom he had given his secrets.

In the so-called Schweige-Lager [isolated camps] and in Schweige-Gefängnissen [isolated prisons] the prisoners have greater internal freedom than in Moscow's prisons for interrogations. On the other hand they have absolutely no contact with the outer world, and no normal chance, after the prison term is over, to leave the deportation center. But no partitions are needed in the exercise grounds of the "quiet" camps and prisons. The prisoners live in a "hermetically" sealed world.

Like much other testimony by witnesses, Muller's report showed how Wallenberg's and Langfelder's cell mates were constantly meeting each other and being exchanged with each other.

In the Soviet's inhuman prison and concentration camp world these changes signified rays of hope which did not exist in the prison hells of the Third Reich. Year after year to be forced to share the cell with the same cell mate is frustrating. Witnesses

have reported that prison officials often asked them with which cell mates they preferred to share their cell. The system facilitates a let-up, not only for the prisoners but also for the personnel, who thereby prevent many cases of neurosis.

Muller Continues his Testimony

Muller had been sitting quietly for quite a while. Now he continued his report, "The Czech was far from being my only fellow prisoner who knew about Wallenberg and Langfelder," he said.

"There were many, among them a Finn, whom I met in cell 92 in the prison Lefortovskaya, where I was brought on 1 February 1948. The Finn talked as little Russian as I, but with the help of my broken Russian and sign language I succeeded in making it clear to him that I had been in cell 105 in Lefortovskaya since 1945. The Finn then pointed out that he had also been in cell 105. His cell mate was then a man named Langfelder.

Later I learned that the Finn had come to that cell at the end of April 1945; that he, besides having Langfelder for a cell mate, had also had for a cell mate a German vice-admiral named Kraft, who had been in command of the harbor Gdingen. The Finn had been in cell 105 only 14 days; then he was moved to various prisons. But one year later he again landed in his old cell, 105. The vice-admiral was still there, but Langfelder had been exchanged for German Lt. Gen. Stachel, who had been an instructor in the so-called Jagerbataljon [Pursuit Battalion] which had been in Finland after 1918. He spoke Finnish flawlessly.

With Stachel as an interpreter, Admiral Kraft and the Finn could talk with one another. Kraft told him, among other things,

that Langfelder had been in the cell until December. During that time the chief investigator had tried to prove that he was an Allied spy. According to the leader of the investigation Raoul Wallenberg, his chief, was supposed to be not a diplomat but a messenger for a Jewish organization. They were supposed to have tried to escape the Russians in Budapest.

One date the Finn seemed to remember particularly well was 27 July 1947. That day Admiral Kraft had been called in for an interrogation; a quarter of an hour later he himself had been called in for an interrogation. At this time the Finn was interrogated by 2 very high officials. They asked him what he knew of Langfelder and what he had learned about the Swedish diplomat through Langfelder. The Finn was also asked whether he knew the name of the "Swede." He had answered then that he did not know it, which was true. Not until February 1948 did the Finn hear the name Wallenberg through me. After the interrogation the Finn was placed in solitary confinement in the basement of the prison to "recollect." In August he tried to commit suicide by throwing himself head first from the window sill in the cell down to the stone floor. He contracted skull injuries and had to be transferred to the "sick-department."

In February 1948 when I again shared a cell with the Finn -- cell 92 in Lefortovskaya -- he had been there a long time, isolated. For 3 whole years this unfortunate peasant boy, who had become half crazy during the imprisonment, was my only companion; at times it seemed that our fate had been linked. For example, we were separated on 24 April 1951, but we became cell mates again on 20 March 1952, this time in the Penal Institute Vladimir. It was not until there,

that the Finn . . . ally began to tell about himself how he, as a child, had had a very severe accident, which still pained and ached him, now he had been taken prisoner on the Karelska Front in July 1944 and how the NKVD, the Russian secret police, had forced him to participate in a film designed to show how the Finns mistreated Russian prisoners of war.

When I asked him about the "Swede," that is Wallenberg, he beat his chest and screamed, "What would it help? I know that I will never be free. The Russians will come and kill me. I have heard something and still I know nothing!"

"It was really too bad about the Finn" Muller continued. "He was continuously terrified and I more than anyone understood his terror. For some years I myself had been considered as an ordinary prisoner of war, but suddenly I was elevated to the rank of spy in a prison for interrogation. Why? Yes, I was among the prisoners who had had something to do with Langfelder. And I had often talked with my fellow prisoners about Raoul Wallenberg. Therefore I told myself: one day the Swedish Government will have the means to free Wallenberg. When that day comes, the Russians will come to check with which prisoners Langfelder and Wallenberg have shared cells. Then these prisoners will be isolated mercilessly so that nothing will be known about the fate of Langfelder and Wallenberg," Eberhard Muller concluded.

Russians Investigated Raoul's Past

Muller and the Finn were right about one thing -- their anxiety about being more severely treated because they "knew something" about Wallenberg and Langfelder. There is much evidence to show how important the Soviets considered the prisoner, Wallenberg but I shall give only one example -- even that is taken from Muller's testimony:

In the concentration camp in Krasnogorsk, Muller told German Captain Quade -- a nephew of Goebel's radio commentator, Quade, a General in the Air Force. Captain Quade told Muller that during the war he was assigned to the German Legation in Stockholm. This supposedly provoked his arrest and his being brought to Moscow. Muller asked him if he had ever heard the name Wallenberg. "Yes," he said, "I know Wallenberg, I lived one floor below Wallenberg's apartment over there. In Moscow I was often interrogated about what I knew about Wallenberg. But, after all, I knew nothing."

Muller had the impression that Quade was afraid to talk about the matter.

The word "drüben" -- "over there" -- I first interpreted as "in Moscow," "in Lubyanka." But investigations yielded the following result:

Captain Ferdinand Bodo Horst Quade, born 1898, was assigned to German's Stockholm Legation from January 1942 until October 1944. He posed as a "transport officer" from Sweden to Finland, but he was really a Gestapo man.

Quade stayed several times for a few days at Grand-Pensionat Dehn, Strandvagen 7A. The US Legation was in the same building, but so was the office for Mollaneuropaiska Handels AB (Central European Commerce Corporation) of which Raoul Wallenberg was the Foreign Director until June 1944.

Without a doubt Quade lived in this pensionat (better class boardinghouse) to watch the Americans.

The intensive interrogation Quade had undergone in Moscow shows how far reaching were the checkings the Russians made of Raoul's past.

Muller and his fellow prisoners were constantly interrogated about Wallenberg. These interrogations culminated, according to Muller, on 25 July 1947. The background material is this:

When the Soviet Union left all official Swedish notes and demarches unanswered, more than a million Swedish men and women united through their organizations in a rescue action for Raoul Wallenberg. They dispatched an address to Stalin. Then our government sent a still clearer note to Moscow.

How did the rulers of the Kremlin react?

Prisoners who had been in contact with Wallenberg or Langfelder were again brought to Moscow. "Atalsfria" prisoners [prisoners, who were to be freed according to certain agreements] who had begun to serve relatively light sentences (8 to 15 years) and even prisoners who were being trained as communist agitators for their homelands and were waiting for the return trip to repatriation camps were accused of trumped up well-studied crimes and sentenced to a maximum penalty of 25 years. This was the sudden activity that the Finn and his comrade observed on 25 July.

Muller and his Finnish comrade were not alone in suspecting a connection between their miserable situation and their knowledge about Langfelder and Wallenberg. Many of the witnesses who returned with the large transports in 1955 and 1956 and who were questioned immediately after they crossed the border explained to the authorities of their own countries and to representatives of the Swedish Government; "We suspect a connection between our contact with Langfelder and Wallenberg and our more severe punishment." One witness declared under oath that the Russian prosecutor himself had openly stated that this was the case.

Vyshinskiy's Notes: Lies

Moscow believed that we had thus been robbed of every chance to obtain proof of Raoul Wallenberg's imprisonment on Soviet Russian soil. Therefore after 32 months of silence Molotov recovered his voice and ordered the vice minister of Foreign Affairs, Vyshinskiy, to deliver a note to our Moscow minister. That was 18 August 1947, still not quite a month after the "memorable" day in Moscow's prisons.

The note explained that Raoul Wallenberg had never been found in the Soviet Union and that he must certainly be dead, probably as a result of an auto accident, a bomb or something else. All searches in camps for prisoners of war and civilian internees had been without result.

That the first statement was a lie was proved by Molotov's own note on 16 January 1945, in which Moscow's Department of Foreign Affairs explained that the Soviet power had taken Raoul Wallenberg and his personal belongings into custody.

That Raoul reached Moscow alive, was testified to by Russia's Ambassador in Stockholm, Mrs. Alexandra Kollontay, who in February 1945 stated that Raoul Wallenberg was in good health, on Russian soil, and that he was not directly arrested, merely in "custody."

Vyshinskiy's Notes: Nonsense

Moscow's other part in the searches may best be characterized as "Goddag yxskait" ["How do you do, axehandle."] Neither in my book, nor in my articles and communiques did I state that Raoul was in a labor camp. On the contrary, at that particular time I

explained that "he is alive, staying in Russian custody in various prisons." Neither Lubyanka nor Lefortovskaya belong to the Soviet labor camp system.

The cabinet secretary, Arne S. Lundberg, characterizes this, the only real note we have so far received from Moscow about Raoul Wallenberg, as a conglomeration of nonsense and absurdities.

Our Moscow ambassador Rolf Sohlman explained during one of his various trips to Stockholm, when I had asked him to be sure to show the Russians that Vyshinskiy's note is a lie, that as long as Stalin and Beria are alive, "We cannot do that, it would look as if we are trying to put Vishinskiy's back to the wall."

Stalin is dead. Beria liquidated. The late Vyshinskiy has officially joined the "army of spies and scoundrels;" and Molotov has Shepilov as a successor.

But Unden has not yet found the time ripe to state openly, "Stop this nonsense."

Don't say that this note is the snow of yesteryear. When Unden had visited Moscow in June 1954, he received the same promises as Erlander received in April 1956. On 29 September 1954 Sohlman delivered a detailed, complete memorandum to Moscow's Department of Foreign Affairs. In it our Department of Foreign Affairs explained the strict demands which the Swedish Government placed upon the interrogations of witnesses in connection with Raoul Wallenberg's time in prison in the USSR, and that only completely trustworthy testimonies were accepted.

On 21 December 1954 Sohlman was received by Semenov, then as now deputy minister of Foreign Affairs, department chief for

the People's Democracies and Scandinavia, at one time Kollontay's closest associate and Charge d'Affaires in Stockholm. Semenov explained: "Nothing new has happened. We refer to Vyshinskiy's note."

How long shall we stand for such treatment?

The government and the foreign affairs administration must, finally, speak clearly to the Russians.

In March 1951 I was sitting together with the Finn in cell 287 in Butyrka prison. On the 18th we got a new cell mate, who even had information about Langfelder and Wallenberg. He was an Austrian. He had been in the same cell with Langfelder and he had given him an explicit description of his past. Langfelder was an engineer, the Austrian reported, and engaged mainly in research and experimental work. His relatives owned the well-known Langfelder machine manufacturing plant in Budapest; but after the Nazi coup the family had to relinquish the manufacturing plant to the Goering concern. During his conversations with the cell mate Langfelder, the "Austrian" found out that he knew the sister and cousin of Langfelder's mother in Rumania.

Langfelder had also reported that he, together with a Swedish Legation Secretary, had been arrested by the Russians in Budapest.

The "Austrian" told me that the "Swede" surely was no diplomat but a representative for a more or less private Jewish Mission who were to protect the legal interests of Jews in Budapest.

"The Austrian" also reported that the "Swede" -- he had not heard his name -- had had large sums of money with him.

Like other fellow prisoners of Wallenberg's we had been called in for new interrogations on 27 July 1947. At that time the Russians asked him about Langfelder and what the latter had reported about the "Swede." When the "Austrian" related this interrogation it seemed to me that I recognized the interrogator again as General Kartulo, whom I had seen several times in Krasnogorsk. It was he who had signed the order for my arrest and the sentence.

The Austrian, the Finn, and I were cell mates in cell 287 in Butyrka until 24 April 1951.

That day the Finn and I were sentenced to 25 years in prison.

When the sentence was pronounced, I was sitting in one of the so-called waiting cells in the subterranean floor of the prison. The guards called out our names. The walls were not thick so I could hear the names of some of my closest cell-neighbors. That is where I heard that the Czech was placed in the cell next to me.

The Czech yelled; "Muller, how much did you get." I answered "25 years."

The Czech; "Me too, Muller, where are you from?"

I spoke about my hometown and he about his. When the guards observed that we were talking with each other they warned us.

Swiss Witnesses Knew "The Swede"

On 20 March I came to cell No 13, where I, as mentioned before, again became cell mates with the Finn. On 15 April we were transferred to cell 51 or 52 in Vladimir prison's main building. There we met a Swiss prisoner H, who, a few months before had been sentenced to 25 years just as we had.

The Swiss knew also about the Langfelder story. That was why he was always placed in solitary confinement or together with some "like us."

The Swiss had landed in a Russian prison because he had voluntarily served in Himmler's Waffen SS, first at the Finnish front and later with the Reichssicherheitshauptamt (Gestapo Supreme Headquarters) outside Berlin. He had, however, "played for high stakes," and at the same time worked for the Allied Information Service, with which he kept in contact through cipher-letters via Switzerland. Toward the end of the war he was ordered to Rumania, where he was arrested by the Russians, after NKVD agents kidnapped him from Schweizerhaus (Swiss house) in Bucharest, where he sought protection.

The Swiss also reported on a German named Roedel, who had been a cell mate of both Langfelder and Wallenberg. Langfelder had previously given me information about this German and had stated that he had become very good friends with him. Roedel had stated that he was Legation Consul first class and deputy minister in Bucharest. He was often called in for interrogations in the prison but was well treated by the Russians; Langfelder supposed that this was because he had given them valuable information.

The Swiss now gave me different information: Roedel had been Chief of the Sicherheitsdienst (SD), Himmler's and Heydrich's hated police organization. The Swiss knew this, because Roedel had been his chief. As Himmler's ranking representative in Rumania he was responsible for the extermination of Jews in that country.

When Langfelder was transferred, Wallenberg replaced him as cell mate to this SD man.

(The Jew murderer Koedel and the Jew rescuer Wallenberg shared a cell. Moscow's motive for this was surely to utilize the war prisoner, who had been sentenced to death, as cell spy. He was lured with promises that he could prolong his life by spying on his fellow prisoners. Neither Langfelder nor Wallenberg knew anything about his past, but Langfelder observed that he was so subservient to the Russians that Langfelder said to him that that was beneath his dignity as a legation consul.

Many of the witnesses in Muller's report have been released from imprisonment, among them the Swiss, the Austrian, and the Finn. Immediately after returning home they were questioned by the State Police or Red Cross representatives in their respective countries. They spontaneously reported that they met a Swedish diplomat or his chauffeur. When they were later questioned by representatives of the Department of Foreign Affairs, it appeared that their testimony coincided in all major points with that of Muller's.

Some of Muller's fellow-prisoners and cowitnesses have disappeared or died in prison. As for the "Czech" (mentioned earlier in this series of articles), we do not know if he has returned. If not, he is still behind the Iron Curtain. Those who died in prison were either very old or war criminals. Among these was Koedel.

When he had nothing more to report to the interrogators, and did not succeed in obtaining proof against Wallenberg and Langfelder, he became of no value to Moscow.

"he was treated well by the russians," Langfelter maintained.

He died in a slave labor camp in 1949. K. Philipp).

Continuation of Muller's Narrative

During the fall of 1953 I was transferred back and forth between various prisons. The long journey home had started. In a transient camp I met a female fellow-prisoner -- she is now my wife.

When Eberhard Muller concluded his report, several hours had passed. My fingers, not used to writing with a pen, were numb and tired.

I read the protocol. Muller affirmed that it was faithful to his dictation by signing it. Vice consul Benkt Ljunglin was a cowitness.

Neither Benkt nor I wanted Mr. and Mrs. Muller to hurry to a department store and later to the station to take the long, and possibly dangerous, return trip.

I proposed instead that the Mullers take a room in my hotel, rest in peace and quiet, take a bath, change from old clothes to new ones, have a beautiful evening with a visit to the movies, and travel home well rested the next day.

I waved the objections that it would cost too much. Karl Evert Sundblad had given me a blank check to do everything for his old friend, Eberhard. Surely some day the Mullers could reciprocate.

First we all drove to my hotel, obtained a room and a couple keys. The registration was accomplished.

We took care of the marketing and returned to the hotel. Benkt and I accompanied Mr. and Mrs. Muller to their door.

The next morning Benkt arrived very early. We went to the Mullers' room and helped them pack. I read the protocol aloud once more. Muller testified again that everything agreed with what he had reported. He wrote a receipt for all the presents I had left for him in the name of Karl Evert. During the night he had written a letter to his old friend.

Muller would not throw away his old clothes. There were many packages to keep track of; therefore I got the cardboard suitcase which I had bought at Tempo in Stockholm before leaving. Then we said good-bye.

Two hours later I was sitting with Benkt in a locked room at the General Consulate dictating the report to the cabinet secretary. The Mullers had now been on the other side of the border for an hour. There was a knock on the door. Benkt went out.

A few minutes later he came back.

Somebody telephoned the consulate and asked excitedly if there was an attache there with a green CD [Diplomatic Corps] automobile. The deputy answered that there were hundreds of such autos in Berlin and put the receiver down. It must have been Muller.

Something had gone amiss.

"If it is Muller he is trying to contact you or me, I answered. Either he is coming to the hotel or he is going to the home of the German, where he wrote the protocol. Muller knows that address. He has a good memory.

Bankt drove me to the hotel and continued to the home of the German.

The room clerk informed me that our 2 friends had returned and placed their baggage there, which they would call for later. I went up to the room and waited. After a while there was a knock at my door. In came Muller. His face revealed fear and hate. He went after me with his fists.

I forced him down in a chair and held his arms.

"What has happened, have you gone crazy?"

"You are a Russian spy," Muller yelled. "You have lured us here to get us arrested when we come home."

"How did you get such a wild idea?"

"When we came to the station my wife wanted to lock the suitcase, which you gave us this morning. The keys were tied to the handle with a piece of paperstring. Such are not to be found in West-Berlin, much less in rich Sweden. You took the suitcase along from the East Zone, but we are not stupid enough to be lured by you."

I asked him to take it easy and went to my suitcase to get a copy of the Swiss Sie und Er. It contained an article about an interview I had had about my work for Kaoul's freedom. The article was illustrated with a picture of Kaoul and myself. I gave the newspaper to Muller.

He first looked at the newspaper photos and then at me. Then he began to read. After a few seconds he had tears in his eyes.

he took my hand and asked my forgiveness. After that he hurried to get his wife, who evidently had been waiting at the door. he showed her the newspaper.

Mrs. Muller started to cry terribly, hysterically. Then she slumped down on the couch and buried her head in the corner.

When she had become more quiet, she said:

"This is God's will. We should not return to the East Zone. We stayed there because we lacked courage and because we were comfortable there. There we have a room, a typewriter, and a little bread. We can start all over in West Germany, even if we may have to live in barracks for a few years, separated from each other."

Muller asked:

"Can you help us stay here? Can you really help us?"

I promised to do what I could to have Eberhard Muller and his wife recognized as political refugees and to get them "hometown rights" and working permits in one of the states in the Federal Republic.

Two years have passed. Eberhard Muller and his wife are living in modest circumstances in West Germany. They believe in the future. A few weeks ago they got one room where mama and papa and their one-year old child can be together.

Muller does not dare to write to the children of his first marriage. They are living on the other side of the border, growing up as "pioneers." In their father they would see only a class enemy and capitalist lackey.

Loertard Muller is grateful that "Mr. Berg from Stockholm" alias Rudolph Philipp came his way. I, who played "Mr. Berg," am very grateful that a couple of paperstrings on a suitcase from Tempo saved Mr. Muller, gave him freedom and enabled him to recollect from his phenomenal mind so many facts from his prison years. Even the data Muller had obtained "second hand" have proved surprisingly accurate when later compared with data provided by returning eyewitnesses.

In a few cases Muller's data have been inaccurate as far as the exact time is concerned, sometimes a few days or weeks. But who could account for every single day without the assistance of calendars, notebooks, pens (or pencils) over a period of 10 years? According to Muller's recollection of Langfelder's report, Raoul Wallenberg and Langfelder were supposed to have arrived at the Lubyanka Prison on 6 February 1945. Raoul's first cell mate, a German attache, whose regards from Raoul constituted the data that instigated my series of articles, testified that it was 31 January. (In the next issue: Agents, Provocators, and Prostitutes.)

FIGURE CAPTIONS

[pages 14 and 15, original]

They hope and fight. The mother of the imprisoned Raoul Wallenberg, Mrs. Maj von Dardel, and his stepfather, and the present guardian of Raoul's estate, Overdirektor (General Director) Frederick von Dardel, confer with the author, Rudolph Philipp. A constant stream of new testimony arrives in connection with Wallenberg's imprisonment. All of it confirms that Raoul is in a Russian prison.

The family is now excitedly waiting to find out if the Russians' detailed investigation will result in the positive solution of Raoul's case.

[page 16, original]

Vilmos Langfelder, Raoul's chauffeur. Even he is still in a Russian prison according to the testimony of witnesses.

[page 17 left, original]

Raoul Wallenberg, "A good comrade" said witnesses -- (fellow prisoners of Wallenberg's home-bound from Russian prisons) -- about Wallenberg.

[page 17 middle, original]

Witness "Muller": contact with Langfelder or Wallenberg, brought about sharper punishment in Russia.

[page 17 right, original]

Benkt Ljunglin, Swedish official of the Department of Foreign Affairs, helped Philipp obtain Muller's sensational testimony.

Wallenberg file - y 26 57

Wallenberg Story Disputed

International News Service
A former Soviet secret police official yesterday branded Moscow's official explanation of the disappearance and death of Swedish diplomat Raoul Wallenberg as a "misstatement of facts from beginning to end."

The Kremlin this week admitted that Wallenberg was arrested and death of Wallenberg held a prisoner in Mos-

cow and claimed he died of a heart attack in his cell in 1947. Rastvorov appeared before the staff of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee Friday and his testimony was made public yesterday.

Rastvorov said he had known Abakumov from the time he entered the security service in 1943, and that at the time of Wallenberg's arrest in 1944 Abakumov was "not the Minister" in charge.

He said the security chief at that time was Gen. Merkolov, who later was executed with Secret Police Boss Lavrenti P. Beria.

Rastvorov said Abakumov was appointed to the top post in late 1946, and was Minister when, according to the Kremlin account, Wallenberg died of a heart attack in prison.

Abakumov, himself, was imprisoned in 1951 by Beria for alleged "social crimes" which included "unlawful accumulation of several million rubles worth of property in Germany." At that time, Beria recalled Merkolov to the Minister's post.

The witness said that three years later, after Beria had been shot these charges were dropped in favor of what he termed a "new obviously ridiculous one" that he was one of the participants in the Beria plot.

Rastvorov said Abakumov's trial was secret and he "merely disappeared."

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

31

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Action

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ENR

Rec'd: February 7, 1957
11:56 a.m.

FROM: Stockholm

Info

ENR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 843, February 7, 3 p.m.

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SCA

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SENT DEPARTMENT 843; REPEATED INFORMATION MOSCOW 23.

Am informed that Swedish Government will announce this evening Russian reply to Swedish representations re Wallenberg case. Reply states that following exhaustive investigations report doctor of Lubyanka wrote Minister of Security in July 1947 has been discovered stating Wallenberg had died. Doctor was instructed to have his body cremated. Reply states doctor dead points out many wrongful acts of minister for which he since executed and deeply regrets affair.

CCB

USIA

CIA

OSD

NIC

Foreign Office has no clear evidence Wallenberg alive after 1947 and is inclined to believe Russian story since Russians did not know Swedes lacked clear evidence of Wallenberg's whereabouts after 1947. They point out how extraordinary it was for Russians to admit having held Wallenberg after so many details.

CABOT

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Department of State

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53-51

Action

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Info

RMR

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FROM: MOSCOW

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1914, FEBRUARY 7, 7 PM

SENT DEPARTMENT 1914, REPEATED INFORMATION STOCKHOLM 20

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION.

SWEDISH AMBASSADOR TOLD ME TODAY THAT YESTERDAY HE WAS HAND-
AIDE-MEMOIRE FROM GROMYKO ON WALLENBERG CASE WHICH STATED THAT
ALTHOUGH NO RECORD OF WALLENBERG COULD BE FOUND IN REGULAR
FILES SOVIET GOVERNMENT, A SPECIAL SEARCH SUPPLEMENTARY
RECORDS PRISON HAD REVEALED A HANDWRITTEN NOTE FROM DOCTOR
AT LUBIANKA PRISON TO ABAKUMOV INFORMING HIM OF DEATH FROM
HEART ATTACK OF WALLENBERG ON JULY 17, 1947 AND A NOTE,
LIKEWISE HANDWRITTEN, FROM ABAKUMOV IN REPLY ORDERING BODY
TO BE CREMATED WITHOUT AUTOPSY. AIDE-MEMOIRE CONTINUED
THAT ABAKUMOV, WHO WAS SUBSEQUENTLY EXECUTED FOR ANTI-
SOVIET ACTIVITIES, HAD BEEN OBVIOUSLY MISLEAD MINISTRY
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ON WALLENBERG CASE WHICH WAS WHY THEY
HAD NO PREVIOUS INFORMATION. PRISON DOCTOR HAD DIED IN 1953
AND THERE WAS NO POSSIBILITY OBTAINING ANY FURTHER DETAILS
THIS MATTER. AIDE-MEMOIRE CONCLUDED WITH EXPRESSION SINCERE
REGRETS TO SWEDISH GOVERNMENT AND THROUGH GOVERNMENT TO FAMILIAR

SINCE SWEDISH GOVERNMENT WILL MAKE SOME FORM ANNOUNCEMENT
THIS, AMBASSADOR ASKED THIS TO BE HELD IN CONFIDENCE UNTIL
THAT TIME.

AMBASSADOR BELIEVES THIS IS PART SOVIET ATTEMPT RE-ESTABLISH
BETTER RELATIONS WITH SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES (IMPAIRED BY
HUNGARIAN EVENTS) WHICH HE HAD SENSED AT TIME VISIT LONDON
BY MR. MALINTEP. HE BELIEVES UNUSUAL ADMISSION OF DEATH
OF WALLENBERG DUE TO SOVIET DESIRE TO
HOLD ON TO HIS SOURCE OF INFORMATION

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AIR FORMER

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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

758.00(W)/2-867

FROM : Ambasad, STOCKHOLM

903

DESP. NO.

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

February 8, 1957

DATE

REF :

SY-2 3/AG-2 40-1

For Dept. Use Only	ACTION	DEPT.	IN Y OTHER
	REC'D		
	2-11	USIA-10 OSD-2 ARM-35 NAVY-30 ARMY-24 CIA-16	

SUBJECT: JOINT WEEKA NO. 6 - SECTION I - POLITICAL

OCB-2 SACLAN-1

1. Soviets Finally Reveal Wallenberg is Dead: (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

After years of official Swedish inquiries, the Soviets have finally disclosed that Raoul WALLENBERG, the Swedish diplomat and humanitarian, died in Lubianka prison in 1947 (two years after Soviet troops picked him up in Budapest). Deputy Foreign Minister GROMYKO handed a note to Swedish Ambassador SOHLMAN on February 6 explaining that after an intensive investigation it was learned that Wallenberg died of a heart condition on July 17, 1947, according to a physician's report to Minister of State Security ABAKUMOV (liquidated in the Beria purge). The Soviets blamed Abakumov for concealing Wallenberg's fate and expressed their regrets. Prime Minister PERLUND presided over a press conference at 4 p.m., February 7 at which Foreign Minister UNDEH and former Foreign Office Secretary-General Arne LUNDEBERG were present to give the details of the Soviet reply on Wallenberg to the press. The story was first released to the Swedish public by radio at 7 p.m. last night. No story in contemporary Swedish history has received the press and radio play given the Soviet answer on Wallenberg. In general, the editorial reaction has been regretfully to admit that Wallenberg is dead but to question the Soviet interpretation. An official Swedish Government declaration stated, "It must be regretted that the Soviet reply contained such meager information." A whitebook on the entire case is expected soon. Wallenberg's mother and other relatives doubt that he is dead and both hope and insist he is still alive.

Comments: (CONFIDENTIAL) The Foreign Office indicated to the Ambassador that since it had no proof that Wallenberg was alive after 1947, it was inclined to believe the Soviet story. An official Government release indicated, however, that the Soviet reply was not fully satisfactory because it was so meager. The entire Swedish nation is moved by what it considers an act of Soviet barbarism.

2. Cabinet Reconstructions: Further Comments: (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

Discussion of the significance of the Cabinet shifts of February 1 (see Joint Weeks No. 5, February 1) has continued to occupy a prominent position in the Swedish press during the past week. The Government maintains that the

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REPORTER

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356/ME/BSL/CG
8 FEB 57

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

ROUTING

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DATE :

TO : DIRECTOR

FEB 9 0224 Z 57

FROM :

ACTION:

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TO DIR

INFO

ROUTINE

PRECEDENCE

CITE

1. ALTHOUGH NOT FAMILIAR ALL TRAFFIC RE [REDACTED] FEEL SOV NOTE TO SWEDES RE RAUL WALLENBERG WARRANTS RECONSIDERATION PARAS 1 AND 2 OF REF. IN TERMS OVERALL [REDACTED] OBJECTIVES AND PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT CONSTANT STREAM SOV PROPAGANDA SINCE HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION CONCERNING WESTERN SUBVERSION, SABOTAGE AND ESPIONAGE, DO NOT BELIEVE SWEDEN GOVT IF SO INCLINED SHOULD BE PERMITTED GLOSS OVER WALLENBERG AFFAIR PERMIT SOVS GET AWAY WITH RIDICULOUS CLAIM ALL ABAKHIMOV'S FAULT. THEREFORE SUGGEST FOLLOWING FOR DIR [REDACTED] CONSIDERATION:

- A. [REDACTED] REOPEN QUESTION WITH SWEDES ON BASIS INHUMAN ILLEGAL SOV TREATMENT WALLENBERG PLUS ARROGANT INSULTING ATTITUDE SOV GOVT TOWARDS SWEDEN FOR PAST 12 YEARS SHOULD HAVE CHANGED SWEDISH ATTITUDE [REDACTED]
- B. IF SWEDES REMAIN ADAMANT [REDACTED] PROCEED EFFORTS OBTAIN OTHER SITE, INDICATE SWEDISH OBJECTIONS AND FRANKLY PUBLICIZE THESE AS INCOMPREHENSIBLE IN LIGHT WALLENBERG CASE.
- C. [REDACTED] ARRANGE PICKUP THIS ITEM OTHER MEDIA WEST EUROPE. ;


2. OUR UNDERSTANDING ONE OF ORIGINAL OBJECTIVES [REDACTED] WAS COUNTERACT SOV COEXISTENCE DRIVE AND FREQUENT USE SWEDEN FOR FRONT MEETINGS, AWAKEN

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

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By 24 Feb 57



CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

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CONTINUING

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PAGE 2

PRECEDENCE

SWEDISH PUBLIC OPINION TRUE NATURE SOV THREAT AND CREATE POPULAR OPPOSITION
TO SOV USE SWEDEN FURTHER PURELY SOV AIMS. IF THIS STILL ONE OF [REDACTED]
OBJECTIVES FEEL COMBINATION WALLEBERG CASE AND SWEDISH REFUSAL [REDACTED]
SHOULD BE EXPLOITED TO UTMOST.

END OF MESSAGE


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
SEVE FOURRIER
 Liqueur de Fine Champagne



DAGENS NYH

Torsdagen den 14 Februari

WALLENBERGS FÄNGELSE



Det ryska fängelset Lefortovskaja, där Raoul Wallenberg satt fängslad i två år — från våren 1945 till vintern 1947 då han förflyttades — medan Sovjet i noter och förklaringar försäkrade att han inte fanns i Ryssland. Wallenbergs cell låg i fjärde, d v s översta våningen; detta är den första bild av Lefortovskaja som publicerats i svensk press.

Inget

Utåtens portarna ha öppnats inte på onsdagen följande morgon.

De stora & varit samlade delen av dag under dagen små delegatier representeras till Sven Schrektersen Berolids Curt LO representera Götter, and man Blom Westling.

Under delegatier deltagare bekräftar avgått avtal tyvades hot o post tillig mer på ett ti

~~SECRET~~

AIR

21-5-86/3

14 Feb 57

[REDACTED]

Chief, WX

INFO

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] OPERATIONS

Proposed [REDACTED] Operation

REFERENCE

[REDACTED] 1 February 1957

ACTION REQUIRED For your and the MEMOS' information and comment

1. The [REDACTED] Press Review of 8 February 1957 stated that the Wallenberg affair has removed every other topic from the editorial pages of the Swedish press. The following excerpts from Swedish newspapers were cited as examples of the editorial reactions to the Soviets' announcement of Wallenberg's death:

"According to the liberal 'Dagens Nyheter,' it was to the interest of the Soviet leaders to wash their hands of the matter. And from their points of view, of course, their version of what happened is the best possible. 'Dagens Nyheter' continues: 'At the same time the statement from Moscow shed a terrible light on the Soviet regime itself, a factor of which the Russians seem to be entirely unaware. They did not grasp the likelihood that other people will inevitably conclude that Russian declarations are not to be relied upon. A year ago we were given brusquely worded statements that the Russians had no knowledge of Wallenberg's whereabouts. Now, the same authorities declare that he has been dead for 10 years and that his fate was in the hands of liars and traitors. What will we hear the next time? That the men who now rule the Soviet Union are also liars and traitors?'

"The leading Conservative paper, 'Svenska Dagbladet,' does not find the Soviet communique satisfactory either, but concludes that Wallenberg is no longer alive. 'Svenska Dagbladet' goes on to say: 'As pointed out by the Swedish Foreign Office, the Soviet note is meagerly worded and cannot be regarded as final. However, it is far better to know this much than be tormented by uncertainty, and the

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20-5425
Wallenberg
1.2

fact that the 'useless' accuse responsibility for Wallenberg. Their written regret is a welcome improvement on their previous attitude which caused so much sorrow and anxiety in Sweden. Public opinion in this country, however, is not going to forget what has happened.'

"According to the trade union newspaper, 'Stockholm-Tidningen,' the 'useless' worded their note in such a way that they can always say later that they had picked the wrong man. On the other hand, all that we know of Soviet methods and conditions up to now would seem to confirm the accuracy of the 'useless' version.


"Stockholm-Tidningen' writes: 'Irrespective of how the delayed Russian reply is judged, we can hardly write off the matter as closed. We are entitled to demand better and more detailed information on why Wallenberg was arrested, of what he was accused, and what happened to him during his imprisonment. We may assume that the Swedish government will be receptive to all new evidence that may help to clarify this matter, not least because of the (unreserved) wording of the Russian communiqué.'

"We do not know what to believe, writes the Liberal paper, 'Handels-Tidningen,' which continues: 'The Russians have not told us everything. It would be just as well to have them give us the rest of the story. Whichever individuals were responsible for Wallenberg's imprisonment and death, in the eyes of the world the Soviet government is responsible for them all. Are we to believe that the present leaders who like to impress the world with their authority were overruled by some minor authorities within the League?'

2. It occurred to Headquarters that the current feelings over the Wallenberg Case might present an opportune time to exploit the disappearance of Arne Koch-Petersen. The above listed reactions of the Swedish press should give some indication on how the Danes might react to a reopening of Koch-Petersen's disappearance. We realize that it has been twenty years since Koch-Petersen disappeared in the Soviet Union and that he is probably just about forgotten by the Danish people, but Ad's reference to him in referenced dispatch indicates that his disappearance is still in the minds of some people. We suggest that you discuss this with the MEMOS. Perhaps they can offer some additional background information which will determine the practicability of such an idea.


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C/NR-1

the U.S. derided the debate. The MVD planned other reprisals. A fortnight ago the Soviet Foreign Office ordered the expulsion of two U.S. assistant Army attachés from the U.S. embassy in Moscow. Last week it followed this up by demanding the withdrawal of two U.S. assistant naval attachés. To substantiate its clumsy charge that the naval aides were spies, the MVD had arranged for them to be assaulted by a civilian mob in an open Leningrad street, under pretense that they had been caught red-handed in subversive activity against the Soviet regime.

The MVD's biggest surprise reprisal was strictly a TV spectacular. Called to Moscow's House of Journalists one morning last week, 200 foreign and Communist correspondents found batteries of klieg lights and TV cameras focused on four pale men surrounded by a curious array of pistols, explosives, maps, Soviet currency, miniature radio transmitters, parachutes and poison pills. Soviet Foreign Ministry Press Chief Leonid Ilyichev identified the four men as Russian refugees, recruited as spies by the U.S. and parachuted into the Soviet Union in 1954 and 1955.

As the TV cameras bore down on their white faces, each man in turn told his fantastic tale. Said one: "In order to turn us into obedient servants and make us forget our love for our mother country, the Americans encouraged drinking, gambling and bad language among us and even took us to Munich to visit immoral houses to enjoy ourselves." Beetle-browed Press Chief Ilyichev tied the show to the Soviet maneuver in the U.N. with a long commercial charging the U.S. with waging a "secret war" of subversion and espionage against the peace-loving Soviet Union. Said Ilyichev: "When you live with wolves, you must be a wolf."

"Well Taken Care Of"

For almost twelve years Russia and its Baltic neighbor, Sweden, have been in a bitter dispute over the disappearance of Raoul Wallenberg, a slender, balding Swedish-legation attaché who was picked up by Russian secret police in Budapest near the end of World War II. When the NKVD drove him off to Marshal Malinovsky's headquarters, on Jan. 17, 1945, Wallenberg said: "I'm going to Malinovsky's . . . whether as a guest or prisoner I do not know yet." Those were the last words ever heard from him.

Raoul Wallenberg was no ordinary diplomat. The polylingual, much-traveled son of a wealthy Swedish banker, he had begun his diplomatic career only some six months earlier after a quiet meeting in Stockholm with U.S. Minister Herschel Johnson and Iver Olson, representative of Franklin Roosevelt's War Refugee Board in Sweden. Olson and Johnson put the mission to Wallenberg simply: Would he go to Budapest as a member of the neutral Swedish-legation staff and, using U.S. funds, try to save Hungary's remaining 300,000-odd Jews (prewar Hungarian Jewish population: 800,000) from Nazi

gas chambers or slave-labor camps? Wallenberg was warned that if the Germans or the Hungarian puppet government learned of his work, nothing could be done to save him. "If I can help," said Raoul Wallenberg, "if I can save a single person, I will go."

With Zeal & Energy. Wallenberg went. He arrived in Budapest listed officially as third secretary of the Swedish legation, his luggage bulging with information on Hungarian underground agents and secretly pro-Allied officials of the Hungarian government. Operating with enormous zeal and energy, he persuaded Hungarian officials that if a Jew claimed neutral citizenship he should not be deported until the truth of his claim had been established. This done, he promptly affixed to



THE LATE RAOUL WALLENBERG
Not as a guest.

the homes of some 20,000 such Jews signs that read: "Under the Protection of the Swedish Legation." He rented 32 houses in Budapest in the name of the Swedish legation, packed them with other Jews; he issued thousands of "protective passports" to still others, finally became so bold that on several occasions he bluffed Gestapo or SS guards into releasing Jews already loaded aboard freight cars for deportation or worse.

Inevitably, the purposeful young (32) diplomat came under Gestapo surveillance. Just before the Russians entered Budapest in January 1945, he went underground. When the Russians arrived, he made contact with Marshal Malinovsky, Red Army commander on the Hungarian front, who advised Stockholm, via Moscow: "... Diplomat Raoul Wallenberg well taken care of by army authorities."

Without Post-Mortem. Then the curtain descended. Shortly after Wallenberg was picked up by the NKVD, a Russian official in Stockholm declared: "Wallen-

berg is not really a prisoner. He committed some follies after liberation, therefore he had to be taken care of. He will return soon safe and sound."

After that, while the Swedish Foreign Office kept up a steady barrage of protests, and Swedish public opinion angrily demanded Wallenberg's release, Moscow said nothing. Last week the Soviets finally broke the silence. Raoul Wallenberg, Soviet officials told the Swedish government, died of a heart attack in Lubyanka prison on July 17, 1947, nearly ten years ago. His arrest and detention, they said, were undoubtedly the result of "the criminal activities" of then State Security Chief Viktor Abakumov, who was executed in 1954 for "crimes against Soviet laws" as an accomplice of his boss, Lavrenty Beria. There was, the Russians said, a report to Abakumov from Colonel A. L. Smoltsov, chief of the Lubyanka medical service, certifying Wallenberg's death, and adding that the body had been ordered cremated without a post-mortem.

Best guess as to why the Russians really had imprisoned Wallenberg in the first place was that he had worked out an elaborate plan for the restoration of Jewish property seized by the Germans, and the Russians wanted to seize it for themselves. What had actually caused his death could only be inferred from the fact that the Soviets blamed all on that old scapegoat, Security Chief Abakumov, without benefit of post-mortem.

RED CHINA

A Many-Fingered Thing

Classic poetry, a favorite preoccupation of scholars, has been in low repute in China since the advent of Communism. The subtle ideograms of the poet's traditional language have little in common with the blunt ideologies of modern Marxism, and for that reason China's top Communist, Mao Tse-tung, has long had to dissemble the fact that he is a workaday poet himself.

In recent months, however, Mao's China, desperately in need of brain power, has spread the word that the old, traditionally trained scholars it used to Hector are not so bad after all. "Let diverse schools of thought contend," was the way the official policymakers put it. Last week, in line with the effort to make the classics acceptable, humble Chinese were getting a look at 18 of Mao's own classic poems all set out in a new poetry magazine. "There is nothing outstanding about them," said Mao modestly, "but since you consider the poems publishable, let us proceed."

Sample Mao classic, written during the famed Red "long march" to Yenan:

*Skies high and clouds spurn,
The eye encompasses the end of the horizon.
He who does not reach the great wall is not a man.
A mere count of the fingers reveals twenty thousand miles covered.*

Mr. Farmer admitted under questioning last week that, if elected, he would vote against at least that clause of his party's bill which promises complete decontrol of 800,000 higher-priced dwellings.

The Psychological Emigrant

Great Britain has a high standard of living, full employment, political freedom, womb-to-tomb medical care, and as much peace as most nations in the world. Why should a Briton want to leave home? Yet when the Gallup poll (published last week) asked, "If you were free to do so, would you like to go and settle in another country?", 41% of the Britons polled answered yes, and another 12% said they were not sure.

This is no sudden mood. In 1948, when Britain was still suffering from war-spawned austerity, 41% of Britons answered yes to the same question. When 35% were still saying yes in 1950, many thoughtful Britons concluded that sentiment on emigration was gradually returning to normal. Today, in the aftermath of the Suez debacle, emigration sentiment is once again on the rise.

According to Gallup's analysis, the wishful emigrants spread across all levels of politics, income and education. A recent poll of Cambridge undergraduates in their last two years showed that among men students 11.3% had definitely decided to go, and another 27.6% were seriously considering leaving. Among women students, 34.1% had made up their minds to leave. Most favored goals: Canada 39%, Africa 10.5%, the U.S. and Australia about 8% each. Said one student: "I want to go to a country where new ideas are needed, so that I can give something to that country rather than just live off it."

Except during the Depression years, actual migration from Britain has always been high (an average 150,000 a year), but the vast majority of those who now say they want to go will never leave. They will go on, as now, behaving on the job as if "there's no future in it"; they have given up hope of making for themselves in Britain the kind of life they want. In short, the main limiting factor on opportunity in Britain's welfare state is that so many of its people believe there is no real opportunity. The debilitating mood of the psychological emigrant pervades the country.

RUSSIA

Down With the Piatiletki

To change horses—the peasant plow horse for the horse of heavy industry—that is the goal . . . of the Five-Year Plan.
—Stalin (1933)

At the beginning of Soviet Russia's shift from a plow-horse to a horsepower economy, the Five-Year Plan, or *Piatiletka*, was a dramatic slogan as well as an effective method of primitive state planning. But when the sixth *Piatiletka* arrived last year, the word had lost its power for millions of Russian workers,

case-hardened by 30 years of ceaseless urging to achieve ever higher production norms. Last week the Soviet leaders indicated that they were ready to drop the old *Piatiletka* for a more relaxed method of planning and executing the progress of their national economy.

At a joint session of the Supreme Soviet (Russia's rubber-stamp legislature), Economic Boss Mikhail Pervukhin admitted that scores of economic targets set for 1956 had not been achieved. Then Pervukhin made, for a Soviet leader, a surprising statement: instead of scolding the workers, he blamed the *Piatiletka* planners. They had placed too much emphasis on oversized industrial complexes, particularly in the coal, steel and chemical industries. Pervukhin promised that industrial targets for 1957 would be lowered by nearly 4% on previous planning, with continued emphasis on heavy industry. More important than the substance of Pervukhin's announcement was the principle involved: the Soviet leaders were scrapping the rigid Five-Year-Plan system for a realistic *ad hoc* economy more in line with the West.

One reason for the sought-after economic flexibility is the crisis in the satellites. Pervukhin ordered new efforts to be made in coal, fuel and cement production in western Russia, to compensate for deliveries no longer coming from Poland and Hungary. Another reason is the need for a new approach to the problem of defense. The declaration that the 1957 defense appropriation is \$24 billion (down 5.6% from 1956) was an obvious attempt to invite comparison with the U.S. defense budget (estimated for 1957 at \$41 billion). Actually, there has been no reduction in the Soviet's armed forces, and the trend,


as in the U.S., has been toward more highly specialized equipment—e.g., guided missiles and submarines—suggesting increased rather than decreased defense spending.

Only one hint of the Soviet Union's vastly stepped-up nuclear program (five bombs exploded since August 1956) was given by Pervukhin: an order to rush work on big electric-power projects—essential to atomic development—at Kuybyshev, Saratov and Stalingrad (on the Volga) and Kairak-Kum, Irkutsk and Novosibirsk (in Siberia). Something speedier and more pliable than the old *Piatiletka* was needed to harness these horses.

The Wolves

With hundreds of key operators working under diplomatic immunity in foreign embassies, the Soviet MVD's foreign-intelligence section has long been the world's biggest and busiest espionage organization. But allied counter-espionage agencies are beginning to box in the Russians. Since 1950 the U.S. has declared 13 Soviet diplomatic employees *persona non grata*. The practice has spread to Holland, Denmark and Sweden, which have recently demanded the withdrawal of suspected Soviet embassy spies. Last month the FBI, arresting Jacob Albain and Myra and Jack Sobel on charges of being Soviet agents (TIME, Feb. 4), hinted that it had evidence of a vast spy network "involving Soviet officials."

No one expected Russia's MVD to take this kind of treatment lying down. In December the Soviet U.N. delegate laid the basis for a counterattack by charging that the U.S. was using subversive tactics in the satellite nations and Russia. While



ACCUSED SPIES IN MOSCOW
Too much Munich.

19/2/57

NY DAG

Grenviken och Sohlman intervjuade av Ny Dag Wallenbergundersökningen omöjlig

Från vår korrespondent KARL SZAFAR
Stockholm. Den omfattande undersökningen från sovjetregimens sida för att få klarhet i fallena om Dr. Wallenberg har inte bringat något nytt material i dagen utöver det manuskript som frammanför till svenska regeringen. Men beklagar i händelse av förhållanden ålyst att ytterligare uppgifter och bevis inte skulle utkomma i det svenska landet.

Detta förklarar på måndagen uttalandet i Stockholm på Ny Dag. Styrningen frammanför beklagar att undersökningen i fallet Wallenberg inte har blivit avslutad som önskas.

Undersökningen har varit ytlig och omfattande det tydliga tecknet på att svenska sidan inte har fått tillräckligt med uppgifter. Det enda material som har kommit till Sverige om vad som hänt Wallenberg i Moskva har varit ett brev som är knappt läsbart och som innehåller en del felaktiga uppgifter. Huvudsaken är att det inte har varit möjligt att få klarhet i fallet Wallenberg och att ingen av de svenska myndigheterna har varit i kontakt med de sovjetiska myndigheterna för att få ut ytterligare uppgifter i fallet.

Även om det under de senaste åren ansträngt och arbetat för att utklara de förhållanden som i det föregående berättas om sovjetregimen.

För sovjetregimen framstår fallet Wallenberg som en av de många ting som inte ska gå under


den allmänna försvaret vid under världskrigets slut. Det är härvidlag inte heller första gången som den sovjetiska sovjetregimen, Sovjet och efterträdaren Sovjetisk Union, som berättat om Boris och hans anhöriga.

Sohlman: Inget nytt

Vid Ny Dags samtal med svenske Moskva-korrespondenten Sohlman förklarade denne att han inte hade några ytterligare uppgifter att lämna om fallet Wallenberg. Sohlman hade i ö. ö. inte varit i förbindelse med sovjetmyndigheterna efter att förhållandet.

19 Feb 57

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19 Feb 51

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Svensk svarsnot om Wallenberg UD hoppas på nya klarlägganden

Den svenska svarsnoten på Sovjetunionens memorandum angående Raoul Wallenbergs död överlämnades på tisdagen av ambassadör Rolf Sohlman till utrikesministeriet i Moskva. Notan var av följande lydelse:

» I sitt memorandum den 6 februari 1957 har Sovjetunionens regering förklarat, att av dess utredningar rörande den svenska beskickningssekreteraren Raoul Wallenberg den slutligen bör dragas, att Wallenberg avled i ett fängelse i Moskva natten till den 17 juli 1947. Ansvaret för den svenska diplomatens kvarhållande i fängelse och för de oriktiga uppgifter, som skeddens den 18 augusti 1947 under en lång följd av år lämnats den svenska regeringen, läggs på de sovjetiska säkerhetsorganen och Sovjetunionens regering uttalar sitt uppriktiga beklagande av vad som har inträffat. Tillika meddelas, att den person i säkerhetstjänstens ledning, som varit den närmast ansvarige för övergreppet mot Wallenberg, har för grova brott dömts till döden och avrättats.

Svensk opinion upprörd

Svensk opinion är med rätta upprörd över vad som förekommit i denna sak. Om den sovjetiska säkerhetstjänsten kunnat handla så egenmäktigt, att den gjort ett neutralt lands diplomatiska tjänsteman till fånge och hållit honom i fängelse under 2½ år utan att rapportera därom till sovjetregeringen eller till utrikesministeriet, så är detta i och för sig ett förhållande, för vilket sovjetregeringen icke kan avlasta sig ansvaret. Genom sitt beklagande har sovjetregeringen också erkänt sitt ansvar. Härtill kommer att så länge Wallenberg var internerad i ett fängelse i Moskva, sovjetregeringen icke kan ha varit ur stånd att i anledning av de många demarcherna från svensk sida skaffa sig tillförlitliga upplysningar i saken, ifall den hade verkställt de noggranna undersökningar, som den försäkrat svenska regeringen upprepade gånger att den företagit.

Påminnelser

Det får i detta sammanhang erinras om att ambassadören Sohlman senast dagen före den som uppgivits för Raoul Wallenbergs död, i Sovjetunionens utrikesministerium påminde om Wallenberg. Dessförinnan hade omkring tjugo svenska påminnelser gjorts i denna fråga i Moskva, efter det vice utrikesminister Dekanov den 16 januari 1945 skriftligen meddelat den svenska beskickningen i Moskva, att Wallenberg påträffats och ställts under sovjettryckt beskydd.

Nytt material?

att tro, att all annan dokumentation rörande Wallenbergs vistelse i sovjetiska fängelser än den rapport, som omnämnes i sovjetregeringens memorandum, skulle vara helt utplånad. Den förväntar därför att, om ytterligare material framkommer i Sovjetunionen, som kan klarlägga vad som hänt Wallenberg, detta delgives

det svenska utrikesdepartementet. A sin sida förbehåller sig den svenska regeringen att ställa till förfogande det ytterligare material rörande Wallenberg, som av den svenska regeringen bedömes vara av betydelse för fortsatta undersökningar i Sovjetunionen.

21 Feb 57

261-5022

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211635 STOCKHOLM, FEBRUARY 21 - (SPECIAL BY CABLE - AUR) - FOLLOWING
TEXT OF NOTE DELIVERED TO SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY BY SWEDISH
AMBASSADOR ROLF SONLHAG ON FEBRUARY 19:

RFF
17
2-21-57

"IN A MEMORANDUM OF FEBRUARY 6TH 1957 THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT
DECLARED THAT FROM THE INVESTIGATION REGARDING THE SWEDISH
SECRETARY OF LEGATION RAOUL WALLENBERG THE CONCLUSION OUGHT TO
BE DRAWN THAT WALLENBERG DIED IN A PRISON IN MOSCOW DURING THE
NIGHT JULY 16TH-17TH 1947. THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR DETAINING
THE SWEDISH DIPLOMAT IN PRISON AND FOR THE INCORRECT INFORMATION
WHICH HAS BEEN GIVEN THE SWEDISH GOVERNMENT FOR MANY YEARS SINCE
AUGUST 18TH, 1947 IS LAID ON THE SOVIET SECURITY AGENCIES. THE
SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAS EXPRESSED THEIR SINCERE REGRET AT WHAT HAS
HAPPENED. THEY HAVE FURTHER STATED THAT THE PERSON AMONG THE
TOP OFFICIALS OF THE SECURITY SERVICE WHO WAS PRIMARILY RESPONSIBLE
FOR THE AGGRESSION AGAINST WALLENBERG WAS SENTENCED TO DEATH, AND
EXECUTED ON ACCOUNT OF SEVERE CRIMES. SWEDISH PUBLIC OPINION IS
JUSTLY SHOCKED BY WHAT HAS OCCURRED IN THIS MATTER.

IF THE SOVIET SECURITY SERVICE WAS ABLE TO ACT IN SUCH AN
AUTOCRATIC WAY AS TO MAKE A DIPLOMAT OF A NEUTRAL COUNTRY A
PRISONER AND KEEP HIM IN PRISON FOR TWO AND A HALF YEARS WITHOUT
REPORTING THE CASE TO THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT OR TO THE FOREIGN
MINISTRY THIS FACT IS NOT IN ITSELF A CIRCUMSTANCE FOR WHICH
THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT CAN DISCLAIM RESPONSIBILITY. BY EXPRESSING
THEIR REGRET THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAS ALSO ADMITTED THEIR

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RESPONSIBILITY. TO THIS IS ADDED THE FACT THAT WHILE WALLENBERG WAS CONFINED IN A MOSCOW PRISON THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT CANNOT, CONSIDERING THE NUMEROUS SWEDISH APPEALS HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO OBTAIN RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE MATTER IF THEY HAD REALLY UNDERTAKEN THE THOROUGH INVESTIGATIONS THEY HAVE REPEATEDLY ASSURED THE SWEDISH GOVERNMENT THAT THEY HAD MADE.

IN THIS CONNECTION IT SHOULD BE RECALLED THAT AS LATE AS THE DAY BEFORE THE ONE REPORTED AS THE DAY OF WALLENBERG'S DEATH, AMBASSADOR SOHLMAN REMINDED OF WALLENBERG IN THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY. BEFORE THAT OCCASION MOSCOW HAD BEEN REMINDED OF THIS MATTER SOME TWENTY TIMES AFTER JANUARY 16TH 1945 WHEN DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER DEKANOSOV INFORMED THE SWEDISH LEGATION IN MOSCOW THAT WALLENBERG HAD BEEN FOUND AND TAKEN IN SOVIET RUSSIAN CUSTODY.

THE SWEDISH GOVERNMENT FINDS IT DIFFICULT TO BELIEVE THAT ALL FURTHER DOCUMENTATION CONCERNING WALLENBERG'S STAY IN SOVIET PRISON WITH EXCEPTION OF THE REPORT MENTIONED IN THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT MEMORANDUM SHOULD HAVE BEEN COMPLETELY OBLITERATED. THEY EXPECT THEREFORE THAT IF ANY FURTHER MATERIAL IS FOUND IN THE SOVIET UNION DESTINED TO CLARIFY WHAT HAPPENED TO WALLENBERG IT WILL BE COMMUNICATED TO THE SWEDISH MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS. THE SWEDISH GOVERNMENT ON THEIR SIDE RESERVE THE RIGHT TO COMMUNICATE FURTHER MATERIAL CONCERNING WALLENBERG THAT THE SWEDISH GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS OF IMPORTANCE FOR CONTINUED INVESTIGATIONS IN THE SOVIET UNION."

END MSG

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Wallenberg for